China Pushes Forward with UAV and Counter-UAV Technology
Evolution of UAV tactics in Ukraine
The ongoing war in Ukraine heavily features the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in increasingly complex operations. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, UAVs have been employed by both sides of the conflict due to their comparatively cheap cost, long operational range, and ability to keep personnel out of harm’s way. According to Politico, as of August 2025 UAVs are responsible for nearly 70 percent of
casualties in the war, marking the widespread adoption of this technology on modern battlefields, as well as prompting the need for counters.
Casualty numbers may be high due to the constant evolution of UAV techniques. For example, at the start of the war, UAVs were used primarily for reconnaissance and strikes, however tactics soon shifted to the more cost-effect use of first-person view (FPV) “suicide” drones. Russia in particular specialized in fielding the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 suicide drone, with Russia production of the UAV reported to be upwards
of 6,000 systems per month. These systems are pilots remotely by an operator and directed to strike directly at the target, increasing accuracy greatly. These systems are occasionally augmented with computer vision AI assistance to guide the UAV to the target in case of electromagnetic interference severing the link to the operator. Most recently, both sides have begun deploying suicide drones operated via fiber optic cable.
While limiting operational range, these systems are resistant to electromagnetic interference to provide a more reliable threat. Even as defensive maneuvers have evolved, drones still represent a huge component of the Ukrainian battlefield, with daily numbers of UAV attacks estimated as high as 140 strikes per day.
Some of the biggest victories for the Ukrainian side have heavily featured the use of UAVs and unmanned surface vessels (USVs). For example, in march of 2024 the Ukrainian military used a swarm of Magura V5 USVs to sink the Russian surface vessel “Sergey Kotov.” Although the exact price of these drones was not disclosed, the Ukrainian military reported that the cost of each Russian surface vessel destroyed by the USVs far outweighs the costs of the entire USV fleet employed by Ukraine. Likewise, in June of 2025 Ukraine carried out a complex operation dubbed “Spider’s Web,” whereby 117 small “kamikaze” drones were smuggled into Russia, positioned near strategic airfields, and activated simultaneously to strike upwards of 40 Russian
aircraft.
As these types of operations have increased in frequency and complexity, so too have the tactics to counter UAVs and USVs evolved in tandem. Primarily, UAVs are vulnerable to electromagnetic interference, which damages the control and communications necessary between UAV and operator. This interference can cause
UAVs to miss their targets, crash uncontrollably, and even become hijacked or “captured” by hostile actors. However, the deployment of electromagnetic interference systems often comes with the dangers of unintended effects on friendly UAVs operations as well. Consequently, resistance to these effects is an ongoing field of development which has seen some success. Likewise, the Ukraine war also saw an early cost-effect countermeasure against small, cheap drone attacks: vehicle-mounted cages. These cages and other pieces of armor act as a first line of defense, receiving the initial attack and triggering a premature detonation of any payload the UAV may be carrying. Similarly, corridors of netting are increasingly deployed to catch suicide drones before they reach their intended targets by snagging propellors and triggering explosives. Overall, the Ukraine war has seen numerous developments in the field of UAV tactics and counters. Both sides have utilized UAVs and USVs extensively due to their comparatively cheap price and long-range capabilities, while also deploying innovative techniques to counter their use.
China’s UAV and counter-UAV Ecosystem
Among the many lessons gained from the Ukraine War, the evolution of UAV tactics and functions has made a lasting impression on many international observers. According to a report from the Center for Naval Analyses, China has accelerated their UAV developments in the past five years, with even more emphasis added since the start of the war in 2022. One major point of emphasis appears to be cost efficiency of UAV countermeasures. China is focused on bringing down the cost of UAV countermeasures, particularly reducing dependency on SAM systems, which can be hundreds of times more expensive than the UAVs they are meant to counteract. Additionally, Chinese analysts noted the trajectory of UAV usage in Ukraine, from reconnaissance and strikes, to the advent of FPV suicide drones, and the current expansion of drone swarm tactics. This centrality of UAVs on the battlefield may have influenced the PLA’s recent procurement directions. For example, one estimate found that since the release of the 14 th Five Year Plan in 2021, China’s spending on UAV development had increased by 67% and was driven primarily by the Chinese military.
One particular focus has been on drone swarms. These large groups of small, portable, and expendable UAVs working in tandem are a cost-effect means of inflicting damage on an adversary while receiving only minimal losses. China has been increasingly integrating these capabilities with combat exercises and developing drone swarms deployed through ground launch, carriers, surface vessels, and submersibles. For example, in November of 2024 China unveiled the Jiutian fixed-wing drone “mothership,” itself a UAV that can carry a swarm of around 100 additional small drones and has an expected range of 7,000 kilometers. This large UAV was flight tested in June of 2025, and may point towards the capabilities China seeks to develop further.
In addition to UAV technology, China is also focusing on improvements to counter-UAV techniques and capabilities. Reportedly, China is building out methods such as electronic warfare, directed-energy weapons, and interception systems in order to counter the growing prevalence of UAVs on the battlefield. As recently as 2024, the PLA found that its countermeasures deployed during an exercise could disable only 40% of
targeted UAVs. In response, Chinese tacticians appear to be emphasizing both a layered defensive system of multiple countermeasures, as well as the use of AI to identify targets. According to a recent article by Defense One, China’s more recent high-profile counter-UAV developments include the YLC-48 “UAV Terminator” portable phased-array radar, CETC’s Tianqiong electronic warfare system, and directed energy weapons such as NORINCO’s Hurricane-3000, AVIC’s Sky Shield, and CASIC’s LW series.
The Chinese Procurement System
In China these defense systems and others like them follow a particular procurement path. Often the PLA’s Equipment Development Department or the Central Military Commission’s Logistics Support Department are involved in procurement and development for tenders on support systems. These procurement bids often go to large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or their affiliates and subsidiaries. Ultimate ownership for these organizations often starts in China’s civilian government, the State Council, and is diffused down multiple layers from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) which administers China’s sprawling SOE system. These SOEs such as AVIC, CASC, CASIC, or NORINCO also often work with state laboratories and research centers either directly or through their subsidiaries. These collaborations are a vital link in China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy and work to turn state funding into research and development projects that ultimately benefit the PLA through procurement. However, they are often hidden or difficult to identify from outside of China’s system.
One example, an ostensively private company known as Shanghai Zhiliang Electronic Technology Co., Ltd. demonstrates how these links exist and function to develop key piece of technology. Although not yet listed by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security as a supplier to the PLA, Datenna has found numerous critical linkages. Shanghai Zhiliang is an organization developing systems that influence
UAV operations, including radar jammers, electronic warfare equipment, and UAV guidance systems. Insight provided through Datenna’s platform, reveals ways in which the company and organizations like it exist within the UAV ecosystem.
Although the company describes its business activities as “technology development, consulting, transfer, and services in the fields of electronics, computers, and communications,” however on the company’s Chinese-language website spells out their ambitions as “focused on the research and development of technologies and
products related to radar and electronic warfare equipment, airborne and shipborne military electronic systems, and simulations,” before stating that their company has developed “multiple product lines, including military electronic systems, data acquisition, and radar system simulation.” This direction indicates a
strong likeliness of helping the PLA disable allied UAVs and aircraft.
Another key piece of evidence is Shanghai Zhiliang’s majority owner, the large state- owned enterprise Sichuan Jiuzhou Electric Group. This parent works on military technology and radar systems, has multiple defense-related branches and subsidiaries, and 45 Defense Patents and 169 Critical Technology Patents. Additionally, Datenna found that the parent organization has at least 141 defense procurements, has worked
extensively with AVIC, and has licenses to participate in China’s Civil Air Defense programs.
For its part, Shanghai Zhiliang has a number of key defense and critical technology patents to its name. For example, Shanghai Zhiliang developed a “multi-target interference signal generation method” which can be used to disrupt communications and control channels, harming guidance, target acquisition, and UAV control. The company has also produced “radar active interference resistance” equipment to combat the effects of electro-magnetic jamming, giving the PLA the edge in an environment with anti-UAV systems. Additionally, Shanghai Zhiliang has a registered patent for a “three-dimensional radar simulation system,” which can be used to track targets with greater accuracy and reduce the effects of “background noise” from interference systems employed by the PLA.
After developing these systems, procurement information on the company shows that they successfully sold the systems and others like them to other organizations in China’s defense ecosystem as well as the PLA directly. Most recently, Shanghai Zhiliang won a major procurement bid with the Central Military Commission Logistics Support Department for electromagnetic jamming equipment. Datenna’s records also
show 8 recent bids, seven of which are directly tied to China’s defense military industry, and the last connected to CETC, a major SOE. Additionally, Shanghai Zhiliang won a procurement bid in 2021 with the PLA directly to supply a unit with radar jammers and radar signals equipment for a UAV project. Shanghai Zhiliang is located in Shanghai Jing’an District’s North High-Tech Service Industry Park, an industrial zone tailored for advanced industries. The company is co- located with at least 16 organizations that contribute to the PLA’s development. Included in these is Shanghai Shuangyang Information Technology Company, a registered military supplier which has provided advanced computer systems to the PLA in thee past.
In short, organizations such as Shanghai Zhiliang demonstrate the ties that exist within China’s advanced development ecosystem like those that develop UAV technology. The organization seems private and is not currently listed as a supplier of the PLA by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, but is actually owned by a key Chinese State-Owned Enterprise, co-located with other defense companies, focused on research and development of radar, jammers, and other electronic warfare equipment, and is working for the Chinese military to delivery these systems to the battlefield. These links are not obvious, but betray an ecosystem that is hidden, layered, and accelerating.
From battlefield lessons to industrial reality
The war in Ukraine shows how quickly UAV and counter-UAV tactics can evolve once they are implemented at scale. But, understanding future conflict dynamics requires more than observing battlefield outcomes alone. It also requires visibility into who is developing these systems, what technologies are they focusing on, and how do they fit into China’s national defense ecosystem.
In our Platform Insight: Chinese UAV and Counter-UAV Capabilities in Development, we examine how these dynamics translate into concrete industrial activity in China. Using patent data, procurement records, ownership structures, and co-location analysis, we trace how companies such as Shanghai Zhiliang Electronic Technology Co., Ltd. contribute to the PLA’s electronic warfare and counter-UAV capabilities.