Research Security with Chinese Entities Continues to Trouble U.S. Institutions

Highlights

U.S. Research Security

In September of 2025 the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and China released a report on Department of War (DOW) research security. The report identified 1,400 research projects funded by the DOW that involved foreign Chinese entities or researchers connected to those entities. Further, approximately 700 of those research projects involved universities directly connected to the People's Liberation Army (PLA), including the so-called "Seven Sons of National Defense." Not only was U.S. taxpayer money used to benefit a foreign competitor, the topics covered in the research also include key strategic fields such as hypersonics, artificial intelligence, drone swarms, quantum computing, and advanced semiconductors, among others. If realized, these advancements could well position China to dominate emerging technologies and seize critical chokepoints in the coming years.

The report tracked research papers published between June 2023 and June 2025 which acknowledged DOW funding or research support. This support came from a variety of offices within the DOW, such as the Office of the Under Secretary of War Research and Engineering (OUSW[R&E]), Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Army Research Office (ARO), and the Air Force Office of Science and Research (AFOSR). Funding for these research projects was intended to support fundamental scientific aspects of critical emerging technology, including topics which are expected to advance the fields in the near to medium term future. Topics of collaboration included drone swarms, new materials, advanced propulsion systems, and explosives, among others.

Although not all of these research fields may be inherently defense-related, the highly technical nature of modern warfare blurs the line between fundamental and applied research, as well as civilian and dual-use. Further, because fundamental research is typically defined by its broad applicability and dissemination, there exists a tension between government funding organizations that prefer their resources only support the host nation, and the scientists who engage in the research and are incentivized to publish and collaborate as openly as possible. This tension was borne out in the examples presented in the Select Committee report, which found that most often the U.S. researchers who engaged in these collaborations were partnering with trusted personal connections in order to broaden engagement with their research. The researchers and institutions they collaborated with happened to be deeply embedded in the Chinese defense research ecosystem, but this may not have been apparent to the U.S. researchers.

These ties are not often clear due to complex ownership structures, or seldom-reported cooperation agreements with Chinese defense organizations. For example, many of the PRC universities highlighted in the report have ties to the Chinese defense industrial complex either directly, or through their participation in Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) programs. MCF is a development strategy pursued by the Chinese government, whereby technology, production, and resources in the civilian or private sectors are used to benefit China's military. Most often these activities are carried out in fields that inherently have dual-use potential, and are achieved through cooperation agreements, direct funding, procurement tenders, or other programs.

Additionally, there are numerous Chinese government programs designed to foster collaboration abroad in order to build China's science and technology base from international efforts. These include plans such as the "National Technology Transfer System Construction Plan" (国家技术转移体系建设方案) and the "Planning Guide for Manufacturing Talent Development" (制造业人才发展规划指南). Among other measures, both programs emphasize the need to bring talented individuals from overseas to develop China's technological breakthroughs. As these talented individuals return from their time studying or working abroad, it's not uncommon for them to maintain their professional networks.

According to the report, these types of personal connections are often at fault for leaked trade secrets and the types of sensitive collaborations the DOW is attempting to prevent. For example, one professor at Duke University held significant ties to the Chinese defense industry through his connections at a joint laboratory in China's Northwestern Polytechnical University. This school is one of China's "Seven Sons of National Defense" (discussed below), and engages in advanced research projects for the PLA. The Duke professor was found to have directed advanced research on behest of the ARO, AFOSR, and NASA while maintaining a key position in the joint Aerodynamics and Aeroelasticity Laboratory and working extensively with members of China's National Key Laboratory of Aerodynamic Design and Research. This distinct conflict of interests represents a vector for malicious actors to obtain sensitive emerging technology. Critically, these issues are not limited to the United States. As a previous report by Datenna highlighted, Europe also faces serious issues of research security and industrial espionage from Chinese entities.

Because of the prevalence of these issues, many western nations have taken proactive stances on limiting engagement with universities and R&D centers that have explicit ties to the PLA, while also remaining clear-eyed about the inherent risks of partnering with any university that exists within China's MCF ecosystem. These restrictions can come in the form of export controls, investment screening, or scrutinizing grants that involve international partnerships with listed entities. Many of the entities present in the Select Committee report are present on these lists. This information is presented in the table below.

Consulted entity lists include the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security Entity List, the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control Sanctions List, the U.S. Department of War Chinese Military Companies List, and the U.S. Department of War List of Institutions with Specified Characteristics.

China's Research System

In China, the highest ranked universities are often directly subordinate to the Ministry of Education. These include at least four entities discussed in the Select Committee report: Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Xidian University, and Central South University.

However, although these organizations and others are officially placed under the banner of the Ministry of Education, much of their R&D direction and research centers were "jointly constructed" by the PRC Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) in order to build China's "innovation system for national defense science and technology" through MCF initiatives. The MIIT's overall mission statement includes implementation of development plans for high-tech industries, and promoting "the construction of a scientific research and production system for weapons and equipment that implements military-civil fusion." Through this system, whereby outwardly civilian institutes are covertly directed towards developing the PLA, China can skirt many international blacklisting and research security efforts.

Much of this work is organized through the MIIT's subordinate State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND). SASTIND works to direct civilian breakthroughs towards the PLA and directly administers research organizations that work on high-tech, dual-use fields. SASTIND primarily achieves this flow of R&D through organizing MCF-related funding programs, publishing opportunities for military procurement, maintaining standards and qualifications for civilian organizations seeking to aid the PLA, and through cooperation agreements that it organizes and administers. SASTIND also directly steers research topics and objectives at the outset of the project in order to benefit the PLA, while overseeing China's nuclear weapons developments.

Beyond these mechanisms for civilian institutions and individuals to assist the PLA, SASTIND also directly administers at least 60 universities and research centers. Included in this portfolio are the so-called "Seven Sons of National Defense" universities. According to an Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) report, the Seven Sons are an affiliation of defense universities styled as "defense science, technology, and industry work units" for China's defense system. Universities and their R&D centers develop technology relating to key emerging fields such as aerospace platforms, nuclear engineering, or missile systems. According to a now-deleted source in the ASPI report, one Chinese study on the country's MCF efforts found that over half of the academics at the Seven Sons either served on PLA expert advisory committees or worked directly on defense research programs. Additionally, one article found that among China's top five universities by funding per researcher, Seven Sons universities held four spots. These statistics demonstrate that the Seven Sons institutes are both well-funded and well-connected within China's defense ecosystem and represent major contributors to developing the PLA.

In addition to the Seven Sons, SASTIND operates a system of state-directed defense laboratories. A report by the China Aerospace Studies Institute and BluePath Labs found that these laboratories have three designations: Defense S&T National Laboratories [国防科技国家实验室], Defense S&T Key Laboratories [国防科技重点实验室], and Defense Core Discipline Laboratories [国防重点学科实验室]. Of the three, the Defense Core Discipline Laboratories are most often affiliated with universities that work in dual-use emerging technology such as the Seven Sons. Consequently, the Seven Sons system holds the highest concentration of these laboratories due to their capabilities in advanced defense research. For example, the report found that Nanjing University of Science and Technology was chosen for the site of the Intelligent Ammunition Technology Defense Core Discipline Laboratory due to its PhD programs in the areas of "Weapon Science and Technology," "Instrument Science and Technology," "Aerospace Science and Technology," and "Mechanical Engineering." This example demonstrates the real impact that these programs and specializations can have on the construction of China's defense science and technology system.

Out of the Seven Sons of National Defense universities, five of the entities were mentioned in the report as having collaborated on fundamental dual-use scientific research conducted through Department of War funding. They are as follows:

[STYLED_LIST] - Beihang University - Harbin Institute of Technology - Northwestern Polytechnical University - Nanjing University of Science and Technology - Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Case Studies

The research undertaken in conjunction with these universities may provide a high level of value towards the PLA, both through the Seven Sons and other universities. As attested below, fundamental science, especially projects which are deemed worthwhile to the U.S. Department of War, can directly benefit the warfighting capabilities of the PLA.

For example, according to the Datenna platform, Beihang University has at least 1,000 patents with defense applications and at least 6,900 that contribute towards China's development of critical technology. Regarding the Department of War research collaborations, personnel from Beihang University participated in projects funded by the ONR, ARO, and NASA on autonomous system swarm resilience to outside interference, their ability to self-organize hierarchical frameworks and formations, as well as strategies for identifying moving targets.

These projects may have benefitted Beihang University already, as shortly after their award Beihang University filed multiple patents in related topics such as a dynamic ground target tracking system for UAVs, target identification methods for unmanned surface vessels, and a collision avoidance system for UAV swarms. These patents were awarded in 2024, following the initial collaboration with the above U.S. institutes.

Likewise, these projects may have already contributed toward PLA capabilities. While the research on target recognition mentioned above was conducted in 2023, Beihang University made a successful procurement bid with the state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) for "UAV visible light target detection and recognition algorithm software" in October of 2024. CETC maintains close ties to the PLA and has a working mission of "leveraging civilian electronics for the benefit of the People's Liberation Army." Additionally, other defense procurements from Beihang University include a "UAV control station interoperability system," schematics for the GJ UAV system, and a UAV swarm identification system. These are all research topics which Beihang personnel partnered with U.S. researchers to pursue with Department of War funding.

This does not appear to be an isolated incident. Research funded by the U.S. Office of Naval Research and conducted in conjunction with personnel from the Seven Sons university Northwestern Polytechnical pursued advanced hydrogen detonation research for propulsion systems. Shortly after, Northwestern Polytechnical University was awarded a patent for a liquid hydrogen conveyance system for cutting-edge jet engines. Around the same time, Northwestern Polytechnical University won a procurement bid with the major Chinese defense SOE Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) for a hydrogen fuel engine design and optimization system. Although the ONR-funded research partnership likely occurred because the university already had technical expertise in this field, there was only one previous hydrogen fuel-related procurement on record prior to the collaboration.

Conclusion

Fundamental scientific research is a critical aspect of modern defense development. However, even seemingly benign topics can be used to support military capabilities. This is especially true for specialized government organs like SASTIND and the portfolio of universities and programs it supports that turn civilian breakthroughs into military applications. Because of this, research partnerships require much greater scrutiny than has previously been applied. Since the release of the Select Committee report, the U.S. Department of War has implemented new measures to protect fundamental research, including prohibiting funding to Section 1260H listed entities, establishing a fundamental research risk review repository, and improving continuous monitoring capabilities. In a highly dynamic and evolving world, the threat will always persist and require constant vigilance.

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