How should EU address China's influence in the Balkans?

The Western Balkans is one of the few European regions yet to join the European Union. The region — consisting of Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, the Republic of North Macedonia, and Croatia (an EU member since 2013) — has been struggling to recover from the devastation wrought by conflicts in the late 1990s. China was therefore welcomed with open arms when it significantly scaled up its investments in infrastructure, factories, and mining in the 2010s as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. This increased investment has granted China a significant degree of influence in the region — a trend observed with growing wariness by the neighbouring EU, which is currently discussing the prospect of some countries in the region acceding to the Union.

Especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese influence in the Western Balkans served as a stark reminder for the EU that it must engage seriously with the region — or risk it ending up in China's sphere of influence.

How Influential Is China?

Chinese presence in the Western Balkans was initially confined to the economy, with Chinese companies mostly engaging in direct investment and project development — with mixed results. Projects like the Pupin Bridge in Belgrade were very well received by the Serbian government, while others such as the Bar-Boljare Highway were met with disappointment by the local population. According to the Clingendael Institute, China's interest in the Western Balkans is mainly attributable to its geographical proximity to the EU — a major export market. The region forms a corridor between Greece, where China already has a considerable presence, and the rest of the EU member states in Central and Southern Europe. Even in 2020, investment continued, with China supplanting Russia as the largest investor in Montenegro.

More recently, China has begun diversifying its presence in the region. Examples include the establishment of Confucius Institutes in all Western Balkan countries except Kosovo (which China does not recognise), and a significant media engagement effort documented in a report by the Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung.

Chinese relations with the Western Balkans are primarily conducted through the China-CEEC framework (the 17+1) — an initiative created in 2012 to promote ties with Central and Eastern European countries. The EU often perceives this initiative as a Chinese attempt to divide EU member states and assert influence through economic ties. Recently, the initiative appeared to lose some of its appeal, with heads of state from several Eastern European member states skipping the annual meeting and sending replacements — perhaps best illustrated by Romania's relatively tough stance on China.

The COVID-19 pandemic opened a new chapter in China-Balkan relations. As some argue the EU failed in its vaccination policy, many countries turned to alternative vaccine suppliers including China and Russia — among them Western Balkan nations and even EU member states such as Hungary. For China, this presented an ideal opportunity to position itself as a "champion of international cooperation" and deepen its influence in countries such as Serbia and Montenegro. The European Council on Foreign Affairs has warned that China is "on the cusp of acquiring real leverage over policy choices, political attitudes, and narratives in some parts of the Western Balkans" — which could prove problematic for future EU-Serbia relations and potential accession negotiations.

How Does the EU Perceive This?

On the whole, the European Union has viewed China's forays into the Western Balkans as an attempt to gain influence in Europe. The South China Morning Post suggests the Chinese leadership holds a similar perspective — viewing the Western Balkans as a geopolitical and market bridgehead into Europe. In January 2021, a cross-party group of MEPs signed a letter expressing concern about Serbia's increased reliance on China and the pollution caused by Chinese industrial investment.

Recent Chinese "vaccine diplomacy" has worried EU policymakers, who perceive it as a clear geopolitical move. China's influence in the region, combined with the distribution of Sinopharm and Sinovac vaccines, has served as a harsh reminder that the EU is not the only actor competing for influence in its own immediate neighbourhood. With many countries arguing the EU has "abandoned" them, increased effort to maintain regional relationships appears essential.

What Will the Future Bring?

If the EU is to limit Chinese influence in the region, it will need to increase its focus on the Western Balkans and develop policy aimed at closing the development gap between the EU and potential member states. China, meanwhile, is likely to continue expanding its economic presence and diversifying its footprint further. Chinese President Xi has already discussed enhancing French-Sino cooperation on Eastern and Central Europe with French President Macron.

It would be wrong to view the Western Balkans purely as an object of an EU-China influence struggle. The political trends and public opinions of these countries will play a significant role in determining the degree of influence going forward. Environmental concerns arising from Chinese industrial investments have already led to public protests in Serbia — if unaddressed, these could shift Western Balkan foreign policy away from China and back toward closer relations with its direct neighbours. Alternatively, countries such as Serbia may seek to leverage the EU-China competition for their own strategic gain.

Watching Chinese investments in the Western Balkans — and the transition from a purely economic presence to a more diversified one — will be essential for understanding the future trajectory of EU-China relations.